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Abstract: Social scientists interested in peasant societies have tried to make sense of their 
economies in terms of the "political" and "moral" economy paradigms. I t is the aim of this 
paper to assess critically the applicability of such models to the informal sector of Irish family 
farms and, in so doing, to postulate the necessity of a different theoretical approach. The 
simplistic dichotomy between "rational" and "moral" behaviour is shown to fall short of a 
satisfactory account of economic relationships in this particular context. The complex inter­
section of different forms of rationality on an Irish family farm, half-way between peasant and 
capitalist agricultural producers, calls for newer and less rigid hypotheses. 
he particular type of social behaviour that we define as "economic" 
_L has been over-analysed and rationalised by such a powerful social 
science as economic theory. Even though the task of economic anthropology 
can be said to lie in the understanding of economic practices beyond the 
logic of market rationality, the research of economic anthropologists very 
often has to be carried out within a jungle of non-anthropological 
competitors. This is especially clear for those of us who have chosen to 
work in western Europe. Precisely because in this particular context, there 
does not seem to be any significant economic activity beyond the 
rationality of the market. 
*Parts of this paper wi l l be published in my book A Sentimental Economy. Commodity and 
Community in Rural Ireland (Oxford: Berghahn Books). I am grateful to the publisher for 
permission to use its material. I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
comments on an earlier draft. 
The aim of this paper is to look at some aspects of the economic 
behaviour of western Ir i sh farmers and to problematise the concept of 
moral economy as regards the specificity of their mode of production. 
Taking kinship and neighbourhood as the social spaces that culturally 
resituate that economic behaviour, my first point will be that the definition 
of kinship and neighbourhood as moral universes precludes us from a 
simplistic application of an individualistic methodology. The investment 
logic characteristic of market transactions cannot be extrapolated to other 
social spheres, because in so doing we overlook the distinctive social 
framework incorporated by their specific system of exchanges. At the 
same time, I will also argue that there is a material basis for those moral 
universes, that there are material consequences derived from the imple­
mentation or failure to implement their idiosyncratic ethos, and that these 
material consequences result from the flow of material exchanges that 
circulate within their respective sphere of transactions. Still, the contra­
diction between morality and rational individualism will be left somehow 
inconclusive; a third possibility wil l be suggested on the basis of data 
provided by ethnographic research. 
My theoretical and methodological framework is that of social and 
cultural anthropology. The data were obtained between 1990 and 1991 
during 15 months of participant observation in a community of middle-
sized family farmers in east Co. Galway (average land holding: 56.9 acres). 
Intensive qualitative research allows no claims to any general applicability 
of one's findings beyond the group of families that were under scrutiny, but 
it permits a better understanding of the social and cultural texture 
embedded in economic activities. What I present in this article is not so 
much the analysis of a new type of economic relations, but rather a new 
form of analysis of a well-known, if not old, socio-economic formation. My 
objective is also, to some extent, to build a model, or maybe to suggest the 
possibility of working with a model with the insight provided by an 
anthropological perspective. But this is a model that will attempt to grasp 
the cultural specificity of western Irish farmers' mode of production. At the 
same time, I wil l try to think of this cultural specificity as the particular 
combination of more general patterns characteristic of non-market ration­
alities in a context of social and economic change. 
I I T H E W E S T O F I R E L A N D AND P E A S A N T P O L I T I C S 
The farming communities of the west of Ireland are in a process of rapid 
social change. I n fact, they have been going through this process for quite a 
long time; but according to the people's historical memory, it looks like a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Everybody agrees that rural society is no 
longer what it used to be and, furthermore, that it will not continue to 
remain as it is now, The past seems to be definitely lost in a cloud of 
confusing and contradictory accounts, idealised and abhorred at the same 
time. The future is imagined by means of current ideologies of modern­
isation that foresee urbanisation and industrialisation, mercilessly devour­
ing the traditional rural economy. And in between there is the ambiguous 
present situation, in which a persistently dwindling community of family 
farms strives to make a living amidst the esoteric dictates of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the world economy. 
It might be because of this uncertain panorama that the farmers of the 
west of Ireland do not seem to fit well into ordinary sociological and 
anthropological categories. To consider them equivalent to the fully fledged 
capitalist farmers from England, and maybe the eastern regions, would 
definitely be inaccurate; to see them on an equal footing with Third World 
peasant societies does not look entirely appropriate either. I t is true, on the 
other hand, that anthropologists working in Europe do not hesitate when it 
comes to defining their subjects as "peasants"; perhaps because they are 
interested, for comparative purposes, in approaching (conceptually) their 
subjects to those analysed by their collegues in more underdeveloped 
countries. But I have my doubts about the suitability of such a category in 
what concerns western Ir i sh farmers, even i f it is just because they 
themselves use it only in a pejorative sense. Perhaps this paper wil l show 
how inappropriate the term "peasantry" can be when applied not only to 
western Irish farmers but also to western European agricultural producers 
in general. 
Rural sociologists, on the other hand, who are probably less interested in 
"primitivising" their object of research, have conversely stressed the 
increasing commoditisation of social relations in European "post-peasant" 
economies. Unlike industry, agricultural development usually implies a 
process of externalisation which multiplies commodity relations (Van der 
Ploeg, 1986, p. 35; see also Curtin, 1986 and Leeuwis, 1989 for the develop­
ment of the derived concept of "incorporation"). But in many places that 
process of externalisation does not seem to have reached its final stage, 
where the traditional peasant self-sufficiency has been fully replaced by a 
"putting-out system". I n these conditions, when there are still factors of 
production, especially a remarkable amount of human labour, that circu­
late outside the market sphere, an ambivalent space of economic practices 
thrives between two different, if not antagonistic, value systems. It is pre­
cisely this notion of ambivalence between capitalists and peasants or 
simply non-capitalists that will somehow constitute the springboard of my 
argument. 
As a matter of fact, and from another point of view, ambivalence can 
also be considered as an idiosyncratic characteristic of the peasantry itself, 
half-way between modern industrial societies and the "primitives" or tribal 
peoples (Wolf, 1966). That is why, interestingly, some of the debates that 
have taken place among students of peasant cultures turn out to be 
particularly relevant to the present discussion. I do not want to go into any 
detail on this subject except for a very concrete question, which I will try to 
present in the most straightforward terms. 
I n the 1970s, the actuality of peasant revolutions in South-east As ia 
aroused the interest of American political scientists. The possibility of 
peasant political action had been dismissed by traditional Marxist theory, 
since peasants were thought to be no more than "potatoes in a sack" (Marx, 
1987, p. 332) with no capacity for collective organisation. Nevertheless, at 
that time they appeared to be closer to overturning the capitalist world 
economy than did the industrial proletariat. But what was the real nature 
of a "peasant revolution"? What made peasants rise up against their 
oppressors, it was argued, could not be understood without a proper 
analysis of peasant society and culture, in particular, the specificity of 
those economic institutions that constituted the backbone of peasants' 
social and political consciousness. Received political theory did not seem to 
provide adequate analytical tools for this type of enquiry. 
From here the concept of "moral economy" started to take shape, a 
concept conspicuously pregnant with anthropological overtones. The moral 
economy of the peasantry, as it was analysed in Scott's seminal work 
(1976, cf. Thompson, 1971), clearly incorporated the theoretical antithesis 
of capitalism. The very idea that the economy could be "moral" explicitly 
contradicts the most fundamental characteristic of the capitalist ethos, 
that defines itself precisely as liberated from the jurisdiction of morals 
(Dumont, 1977, pp. 61-81). Thus, an economic system predicated upon the 
concepts of individualism, selfishness, profit-maximising attitudes, etc., 
found its counterpart in the communitarian and altruistic values of the re­
discovered peasantry. 
Although "moral economists" took great pains to make their arguments 
sophisticated, they carried the danger of a romantic idealisation of peasant 
societies that did not escape their critics. Shortly after the publication of 
Scott's study, Popkin retorted with another analysis of peasant politics in 
South-east Asia with the very meaningful title of "The Rational Peasant" 
(1979). Methodological individualism was substituted here for the "moral 
economy approach" to peasant society. Theories of individual decision 
making and individual choice were used for the interpretation of peasant 
institutions in an analogous fashion to the analysis of ordinary market 
economies. "Instead of an investment logic for markets, on the one hand, 
and a normative logic for villages and patron-client relations, on the 
other", Popkin claimed that, "there is a similar investment logic for both 
situations" (p. 244). He was very explicit, however, when it came to dis­
tancing his approach from that of free-market economics. His was "political 
economy" and not "market economics", since this latter overlooks the socio­
political context in which peasants' economic behaviour takes place. 
The necessity of making sense out of a very concrete historical situation 
— peasant insurgency in South-east Asia — sparked off this controversy 
between "moral" and "political" economists. But still, it remains clear that 
the general theoretical background upon which it developed has important 
implications for the conceptualisation of economic behaviour in a non-
market context. For moral economists, economic action in peasant societies 
has a normative character; it has to be understood as the implementation 
of a moral rule with complete disregard for the interests of the individual, 
otherwise it will appear to us as utterly irrational. For political economists, 
by contrast, it is the primacy of the individual's interests and his/her 
strategically oriented behaviour that deserve the utmost attention, taking 
into account the important qualification that those individual interests 
include both economic and socio-political dividends. 
I l l T H E "MORAL E C O N O M Y " O F F A M I L Y F A R M E R S 
None of these models in their most simplistic formulation — which, 
certainly, does not do full justice to their actual complexity — seemed to be 
consistent with my observations among western Ir i sh farmers, especially 
in relation to their non-market economic relations. Even though the farm­
ing communities of the west of Ireland are deeply integrated into the world 
market economy, they undoubtedly participate in the individualistic and 
profit-maximising ethos that characterises all capitalist societies, they still 
have a substantial sphere of non-commodity transactions. According to my 
data (cf. Hannan, 1972 and 1979), 1 despite the increasing importance 
of work done by agricultural contractors, non-market economic relations 
are basically found among middle-sized farmers in what concerns the 
organisation of the labour processes. This is what is normally defined as 
the sphere of "informal co-operation". Even though I lack the required 
quantitative evidence, I would suspect that it is precisely among this type 
of agricultural producers, those who are neither very big nor very small, 
L See also the debate between Hannan (1979) and Cuddy and Curtin (1983) about the 
hypothetical existence of a "natural economy" in rural Ireland before the Second World War. 
that informal co-operation develops more intensively. And it is in this 
domain of economic relations that neither the moral economy nor the 
political economy approaches provided, in my view, an entirely satisfactory 
perspective. 
Yet at the same time, both of them hint at important attributes of that 
sphere of non-commodity transactions. Farmers exchange all sorts of 
different services and products on a regular basis without taking any 
account of what is given for what. No customary regulation seems to rule 
this unsystematic flow of exchanges but a diffuse norm of generalised 
reciprocity. I n the absence of explicit contractual agreements, there is a 
certain feeling of moral bonding that obliges one to reciprocate the help 
that one has obtained. It is a feeling of moral bonding that never seems to 
harden into a precise normative conduct, though. On the other hand, it 
would not be difficult to work out an underlying "investment logic" in all 
those informal transactions, especially if we take a long-term perspective 
(Bloch, 1973). But to look for surreptitious strategic attitudes behind an 
apparently normative or quasi-normative behaviour is always a tricky 
endeavour. 
I n any case, I should make it clear that on closer examination those 
unsystematic exchanges turned out to be less so. Generalised reciprocity 
always presupposes the existence of a social framework that sanctions the 
development of an otherwise arbitrary gift-giving. A first approach to the 
nature of this social framework in the farming communities of the west of 
Ireland can be represented in a very simple model. By and large, farmers 
seemed to co-operate informally only with people falling into at least two of 
the following categories: relatives, neighbours and farmers. That is to say, 
they would mainly co-operate with people who were either relatives and 
neighbours, relatives and farmers, neighbours and farmers or all three at 
the same time. The explanation runs as follows. 
Relations of generalised reciprocity, as opposed to contractual agree­
ments, do not involve any fixed and predeterminate form of payment. But 
what they certainly involve, however, is an expectation that some form of 
counter-service wil l flow in the long run. That is why a trust bond 
constitutes the basis of a relation of generalised reciprocity. The question 
we have to answer now is how such expectation is created. A farmer can 
2. Even though Hannan's ini t ia l research on rural communities in Ireland remarked on 
the replacement of the more communal orientation of earlier times by interests in personal 
gain and individual family advancement (1972, p. 181), he also noted how the disintegrating 
mutual aid system had given rise i n many cases to dyadic or triadic alliances amongst the 
more commercialised farmers and to the strengthening of a more widely scattered k in group 
(p. 182). 
easily reciprocate the help he received from another farmer, since both are 
engaged in the same type of work, but two or more farmers will very rarely 
co-operate unless they happen to be also neighbours or relatives. I t is easy 
to understand why. Were I to help a farmer who did not live i n my 
neighbourhood I would have few possibilities of getting back any assis­
tance from him, since he would probably not travel too long a distance just 
to reciprocate my help. So the expectation of getting my return would be 
very low. Now, i f the man is not my neighbour but happens to be my 
relative he might not travel that distance either, but there is already a 
circulation of reciprocal services between the two of us and our respective 
families: we exchange gifts at every rite of passage, we visit each other on 
Sunday afternoons, we might borrow money from each other, we might 
help each other in situations of family crisis, etc. Therefore, I can draw 
upon the already existing system of exchanges in order to "get paid" for the 
help I offered. The expectation of getting my return is, consequently, 
higher. But what would happen then if the man who is helping on my farm 
were a relative but not a farmer? There would already be a system of 
exchanges linking the two of us as kin or affines. But that would not suffice 
to guarantee that I would have enough opportunities to return the help I 
was getting from him on my farm. He would have then a low expectation of 
having his help reciprocated. That is, unless there was something more to 
it: unless he was a neighbour too. Similarly to kinship, neighbourhood 
provides another system of off-farm reciprocal exchanges: babysitting 
services, lifts to town, any type of domestic assistance, visiting, etc. There­
fore, the combination of those two systems of reciprocities, those involved 
in kinship and those involved in neighbourhood, increases the likelihood 
that the help I got from my neighbour relative on my farm can be 
reciprocated. 
It is apparent from this that the farm provides a space for reciprocal 
exchanges and social interaction. But this space can only be operative, as 
far as relations of generalised reciprocity are concerned, i f it acts in 
combination with other two similar spaces, neighbourhood and kinship. 
Left on its own, that is to say, without the complement of those two sets of 
social relations, the farm would lose much of its social character, it would 
become a purely economic entity that could relate to its subjects only 
through contractual agreements, the same as any other capitalist business. 
Conversely, kinship and neighbourhood provide a social space for a 
particular type of economic activity: farm work. But they can only be 
operative, as far as that economic activity is concerned, i f they act in 
combination with each other, or in combination with the space provided by 
the farm itself. Left on their own, they would lose much of their economic 
significance, as happens with kinship and neighbourhood in the rest of 
capitalist society. 
Underlying the capacity of the farm to assimilate, so to speak, different 
sets of social relations, there is the propensity of farm labour to circulate 
within social spheres that we would not normally associate with the 
economy. I n so doing, the economic nature of farm work seems to become 
more and more confused into different orders of non-economic trans­
actions and, at the same time, those non-economic transactions become 
generously pervaded by a certain sense of economic logic. This is what, in 
the last instance, turns the farm into the meeting point of different types of 
"rationalities", economic or otherwise. As Mendras has argued, "on the 
family farm everything is both social and economic, and purchases of a 
tractor, a refrigerator, or a washing machine are all made according to the 
same procedure, allowing no opportunity for the economist to impose his 
point of view." (1970, p. 87). 
T h i s de-economisation of farm work also has another significant 
consequence: it enables the farm to absorb and to become fused into the 
cultural specificity of its social milieu. Even though the model that I have 
just outlined has been couched in very abstract terms, it is important to 
note that the relevance of kinship and neighbourhood as social frameworks 
for a specific set of productive relations cannot be taken as a universal fact. 
On the contrary, it is widely accepted that the so-called "amoral familism" 
of rura l societies foils in other cultural contexts the possibility of co­
operative links between un-related neighbours (Banfield, 1958; Campbell, 
1964) — despite the strong theoretical and methodological criticism that 
such a concept has received (Silverman, 1968). Similarly, kinship and 
affinity do not always suit the implementation of economic functions, as 
Ott has observed among Basque shepherds (1981, p.61; cf. Abrahams, 
1984, pp. 114-115). 3 
The above model has very little meaning unless we refer it to the 
particular cultural features of western Irish farmers. Thus, the principle of 
unigeniture in what concerns the inheritance of the family agricultural 
land, coupled with the widespread practice of offering a building site to 
non-inheriting children, gives rise to the proliferation of what we could call 
"extended family neighbourhoods": a farmer is very likely to have some of 
his brothers' or sisters' non-farming families living nearby. Hence the 
overlapping of kinship and neighbourhood is not merely a coincidence but 
3. According to Hannan and Katsiaouni, despite all the "modernising" changes that have 
been affecting Irish rural communities for so long, the primary ascriptive groups of kinship 
and neighbourhood still constitute the most significant networks of interaction (Hannan and 
Katsiaouni, 1977, pp. 86-87). 
the result of a distinctive inheritance practice. Similarly, a remarkable 
pattern of local exogamy combined with occupational endogamy — farmers 
usually marry farmers' daughters from other parishes — extends affinity 
bonds beyond the limit of one's vicinity, so that the existence of those 
affinity bonds in non-neighbouring farmers appears in this case as the 
outcome of a specific marriage custom. 
A case study will help us put a bit of flesh and blood into this somewhat 
arid discussion. But before that, it is worth having a closer look at the 
meaning of kinship and neighbourhood in their role of social frameworks 
for the farm economy. 
I V M O R A L I T Y AND R E C I P R O C I T Y 
The possibility that kinship and neighbourhood might fulfil this 
particular function stems directly from their capacity to constitute 
themselves as moral universes. I t is from this "moralistic" point of view 
that the sphere of transactions distinctive of those two social domains 
cannot be too hastily subsumed under an investment or profit-maximising 
logic. Within one's kindred or neighbourhood there is a specific set of rights 
and obligations that does not apply to outsiders. This is what classical 
anthropological theory defined as "amity" or "prescriptive altruism" for the 
kinship sphere (Fortes, 1969, pp. 219-249, who explicitly referred to its 
possible extension to neighbourhood relationships (pp. 242-245)). Following 
Young and Willmott's study of east London (1986), Fortes explained this 
moral character in terms of the ascriptive character of kinship bonds 
(p.242). Because I do not relate to my kin out of my own wil l but simply 
because they are my kin, we can have full confidence in each other since 
we are not linked by any particular interest; our relationship is beyond our 
wi l l . 4 
Let us see now the qualities of these moral universes as regards their 
respective "spheres of exchange". The logic that underlies the exchange of 
gifts as opposed to the exchange of commodities corresponds to what 
4 It is true, on the other hand, that Fortes, and anthropological theory on kinship in 
general terms, defines the specificity of the kinship bond in opposition to affinity. The extent 
to which affinity stems out of a marriage contract seems to exclude it from the sphere of 
ascriptive relationships. It should be noted, however, that this contractual character affects 
the link between husband and wife, but it appears as much less definitive in what concerns 
the relationships of each partner with his/her respective in-laws. The fact that I relate to my 
in-laws has to be explained in terms of the kinship — and, therefore, ascriptive — bond that 
links them to my wife, despite the contractual nature of the bond that links me to my wife. 
Furthermore, the affective content encapsulated in a marriage bond sets it quite apart from 
any other form of ordinary contractual relationship. I shall return to this. 
anthropologists call "generalised reciprocity", following Sahlins's elegant 
theorisation (1972). When goods and services circulate freely between 
people who do not expect anything in return for what they give there is the 
notion that mutual debts will balance out in the long term. The com­
bination of Sahlins's theory with the moralistic perspective argued by 
Fortes suggests the possibility of establishing a scale that would go from 
"pure" contractual relationships, including both commodity exchanges and 
barter, to "pure" moral links. At the one extreme we would have all those 
exchanges that do not entail any moral bond between the parties; 
monetary transactions would figure prominently among them. 5 Somewhere 
in the middle we would find all the different gradations of "reciprocal 
exchanges" in which some feeling of delayed returns is not entirely absent, 
so that they cannot be understood as merely the result of a moral duty; but 
at the same time, the parties are not entitled to offer their services in the 
expectation that they are going to be reciprocated (Pitt-Rivers, 1971, 
p. 139), so there is in them some sense of moral obligation as well. Finally, 
at the other extreme we would have those transactions that take place 
simply as the implementation of moral responsibilities and for which no 
counter-service is i n any form envisaged. Therefore, the degree to which a 
specific service is offered with some expectation of reciprocity, or the 
degree to which it is offered out of a moral obligation, would help us to 
place each particular transaction between the two poles of the spectrum. 
The morality of kinship and neighbourhood that I could see in operation 
among the family farmers of the west of Ireland was of a very special 
sort. I t was far from the universalistic character that, according to 
social philosophers, should distinguish all moral precepts. 6 It had a very 
apparent material dimension that somehow reminded me of the relevance 
of individual interests, that somehow evoked a disguised "investment 
logic". But to reduce it to a mere long-term maximising rationality appears 
to me as a cunning simplification that misses important elements of 
human experience. I n what follows I will present a very brief case study 
that will illustrate some of the points that have already been developed. 
Perhaps the dramatic intensity of an ordinary event might help us to 
reformulate more clearly our theoretical predicaments. 
5. Cf. Macfarlane's analysis of the "ammoral" character of money as "the root of all evil" 
(1987, pp. 98-122; cf. Bloch and Parry, 1989, pp. 17-19). 
6. Cf. Campbell's assertion that the values of honour and prestige among the Sarakatsani 
"have a moral content of their own but they cannot be referred to any universal moral 
principle" (1964, p. 317). 
V H A Y T I M E I N T H E W E S T O F I R E L A N D 
This case-study was recorded in a farming community of County 
Galway, during the hay harvest of the summer of 1990. The hay harvest is 
such an important event in the farming communities of the west of Ireland 
that it really looks as if making hay is what farming is all about to them. 
The hay harvest turns out to be a catalyst for social engagements of 
unparalleled intensity and transcendence. For the hay harvest, anyone 
who happens to be around will be recruited: farmers and non-farmers, men 
and women, children and elders, neighbours, relatives, strangers, 
anthropologists, are all thrown into the hay field. The result is a rich and 
complex mixture of social relations: informal co-operation, contractual 
agreements, kinship obligations, good neighbourliness. I t seems to me that 
the hay harvest can be taken as a kind of synecdoche of the social world of 
the farming communities of the west of Ireland, a singular event endowed 
with the strange capacity to materialise in a few weeks, maybe in a few 
days, all the intricacies of a particular social structure. 
I n the summer of 1990, the hay harvest of my neighbour Joe Maloney 7 
validated in the apparent simplicity of a prosaic episode the complexity of 
all those cross-cutting connotations. Joe is a full-time farmer with 45 acres 
of land; he is married and has four children aged between 12 and 3 years. 
For the hay he usually gets the help of his friend and next-door neighbour 
Sean Rabbitte, a young bachelor and part-time farmer. That summer, 
however, Sean was not available. The weather had been very good thus far, 
but heavy showers in a few days had been forecast, so everybody in the 
parish was suffering from "hay madness". Networks of reciprocity were put 
to their limit; some of them were broken, new ones created. To save the 
hay was the top priority at the time, at whatever cost. 
But Joe found himself collecting the bales on his own, with the help only 
of his wife and his eldest son. To pick up bales of hay is a tough job; they 
have to be lifted with a fork and thrown into a trailer, where somebody has 
to build them up. Even though Joe's wife and the child were doing their 
best, the work was advancing very slowly, much to Joe's distress. I n the 
meantime, Padraig Kelly, Joe's foster brother who also happens to live just 
a few yards from him, was coming home from work at half past five every 
evening without paying too much attention to his neighbour's sufferings, 
and not entirely because he is not fond of farm work. Padraig is a factory 
worker, married as well with three little children, and reared on the same 
family farm as Joe. Enthusiastic as he always was for the things of the 
farm, he inherited only a building site from his foster father; Joe got the 
7. All proper names used in this paper are pseudonyms. 
farm. Very bitter feelings have arisen between the two men ever since. 
Despite this bad relationship between Joe and P£draig, their two 
respective wives, Maire and Teresa, get along extremely well. They baby­
sit for each other now and again and have lots of cups of tea together every 
day. While Maire has a driving licence, Teresa does not, so the latter gets 
lifts from the other whenever she wants; this is very important in isolated 
settlements. Maybe it was this well-established relationship of good 
friendship and domestic reciprocities that triggered off the concern of 
Padraig's wife for what was going on. "It is a sin to see our neighbours 
killing themselves at the fields and not give them any help", she would 
repeat now and again, with no positive answer from P&draig. But 
sometimes she would adopt a more conciliatory tone, "and then again we 
are not farmers, you see, we are independent and we owe nothing to them. 
It's time for them to do a bit of work, all year round sitting back while we 
are working every day!'' I n any case, whatever changes of mood she might 
show, probably just a device to get around Padraig's assertive patriarchal-
ism, she was perfectly aware of her increasingly delicate situation. She had 
become the precarious link between two antagonistic moral universes: her 
husband's and her friend's husband's. 
It was a fragile tie that was about to break if those moral universes fell 
too violently apart. The following Saturday the two women were supposed 
to go to mass together. Teresa phoned her neighbour to ask her about it, 
but one of Maire's sons said that she was not in. "But she must be in since 
the car is at the door", Teresa observed. That Saturday, Maire was not 
going to give her any lift. Whatever the reason for it was, the important 
thing to note here is her own personal interpretation. "That's it, see, we 
didn't help them for the hay, now I couldn't go to mass." I n her under­
standing of the situation, there was a unique circuit of reciprocities linking 
the two households wherein farm labour, domestic services, friendship and 
neighbourhood relationships of whatever kind all mixed together and were 
mutually exchangeable, in such a way that the breaking of that circuit by 
any of its components, farm labour in this case, would inevitably stop the 
normal flow of the rest. 
Fortunately, things did not go all that far. The next day Joe realised 
that he could not manage only with the help of his wife and son, so he 
decided to ask P£draig explicitly for help. Confronted by his foster 
brother's explicit request, there was no way Padraig could refuse it if he 
really did not want to provoke a very serious estrangement between the 
two of them. He was even thinking of taking a day off from the factory to 
work with Joe. I n a few days he would have his summer holidays and he 
would certainly not feel like working then. "When you are at home all day 
you cannot avoid helping." So for the following three days Padraig went 
to the hay field as soon as he came home from the factory. And an 
immediate reactivation of the circulation of reciprocities between the two 
households ensued. While the two men were working together with the 
help of Joe's wife, Teresa did the baby-sitting of the small children for the 
two families. (Before that they had been with the old couple, Joe and 
Padraig's foster parents.) Furthermore, on Wednesday, when the women of 
the parish usually go to bingo, the two women went together in Maire's 
car. 
V I R O O M F O R T H E I N T I M A T E 
That was the social framework of the farm economy in operation. Case-
study analysis is a time-honoured research tool in social and cultural 
anthropology with not many adherents among the rest of the social 
scientists. But when it is meaningfulness rather than generality that we 
are looking for it turns out to be an irreplaceable technique to grasp the 
intricacies of social interaction. Le t us have a quick glimpse at the 
radiography of that social framework. At this concrete level, it certainly 
turns out to be slightly more complex than it looked in the abstract model. 
We have, on the one hand, relations of good neighbourhood qualified by a 
loose bond of fictive kinship (fosterage) l inking the two men, Joe and 
P&draig. On the other, we have the same relation of good neighbourhood 
coupled with an even looser tie of what we could define as "fictive affinity" 
linking the two women, Maire and Teresa. I n both of these situations we 
could claim that there is a certain feeling of moral duty derived from the 
intersection of two sets of social relations, kinship and neighbourhood, two 
sets of social relations that should also be understood as moral universes. 
But it is a moral duty that incorporates very different emotional contents 
and, furthermore, a difference that seems to be inversely correlated with 
the presence of the (fictive) kinship bond. Maire and Teresa, only fictive 
affines, keep on good terms; whereas Joe and Padraig, foster brothers, 
have a very cool relationship. This emotional dimension, on the other hand, 
is even more apparent in the tie that, in turn, links the two men with the 
two women: marriage. I t is because Teresa is married to Padraig and 
Maire to Joe that the contingencies of the relationship between the two 
foster brothers reverberate on the set of reciprocities linking the two 
women: Maire did not get her lift because her husband did not help Joe. 
It could be argued from this that the economic relation that enabled Joe 
to save his hay has an undeniable moral nature. But to understand this 
economic relation as an instance of a moral economy should not make us 
overlook the capacity of such a relation to act as an "emotional container", 
so to speak. Because, in the last instance, that emotional content decisively 
determined the actual possibility of the economic transaction between the 
two foster brothers. P£draig was under a moral obligation to help Joe with 
the hay harvest. But the bitter feelings that exist between the two men, 
and that prevented Padraig from giving a hand to his foster brother in the 
first place, cannot be deduced from that moral duty. I have suggested that 
Pddraig's dis-inheritance from the family land has certainly contributed to 
that animosity. But in a system of unigeniture, such as that prevailing in 
the west of Ireland, there is dis-inheritance from the family land at every 
generational replacement, and this does not necessarily lead to the 
breakdown of all relationships between siblings! In other words, what I am 
trying to suggest is that the hostility between the two foster brothers 
cannot be understood without considering the emotional side of all long­
standing and intimate relations. I t is a hostility that, interestingly, was 
always explained to me in terms of the lack of a blood tie. 
On the other hand, we could cynically claim that the pressure exercised 
by Maire on her husband, although couched in a moral language ("it is a 
sin to see our neighbours killing themselves at the fields and not give them 
any help"), was in actual fact motivated by her interest in maintaining a 
good relationship with Joe's wife. But why did Pddraig give in to his wife's 
persuasion? Because he did not want to strain the stability of his own 
marriage by putting at risk his wife's friendship with Maire? Because he 
eventually felt the moral duty that obliges him to help his neighbour and 
foster brother? Or maybe the moral duty that compels him to keep his 
wife happy no matter what? Again, we realise that the dichotomy norma­
tive/strategical does not exhaust all the possibilities of human behaviour. 
T h i s dichotomy normative/strategical reverberates in other well-
established oppositions in social theory that are now being put into 
question: contract/status, gift/commodities, community/association, indi­
vidualism/collectivism, etc. Al l of them, to some extent, are derived from 
the now much-criticised discrimination between tradition and modernity. 
I n what way does the present discussion help overcome such time-
honoured polarities? I n the foregoing account I have been emphasising the 
importance of the emotional side in the social relationships under study. 
Structural analysis in social anthropology (both British and French) has 
always been at pains to cast away the sphere of personal emotions and 
sentiments as merely "psychological" variables, inimical to the undisputed 
sociological method that lies at the heart of anthropological theory (cf. 
Rosaldo, 1993, pp. 59sq.). I t is not my intention to vindicate the need for 
introducing some form of psychological bias into the analysis of social 
relationships, but merely to open the space for a deeper (sociological) 
understanding of the economic behaviour we have been looking at in the 
previous paragraphs. 
For this purpose, I will borrow Cheal's concept of "structures of 
intimacy" (1988, pp. 106sq.), a concept that he developed in his study of the 
gift economy in a Canadian urban community. Cheal criticises Mauss's 
failure to distinguish between what he calls structures of community and 
structures of intimacy as regards the moral economy of gift transactions. It 
is a distinction that has to do with the way in which the individual feels 
compelled to give gifts. The gift offered under a community structure is 
always the result of an overarching moral norm, originating either in 
neighbourhood, kinship, religious community, etc. But nothing of that 
exists when the gift circulates within a structure of intimacy; in this case, 
it can be seen only as the consequence of a personal attachment, 
independent of any group norm. "Moral individualism" is the expression 
Cheal uses to characterise the logic of this type of transactions (p. 173). 
Gifts exchanged by lovers on Valentine's Day constitute a good example. 
Even though Cheal is dealing mainly with "ritual" transactions that 
have little to do with the sphere of informal co-operation that I am 
interested in, I think that his distinction between community and intimacy 
is particularly relevant to my argument. There is, we could claim, a sphere 
of transactions, or a sphere of human behaviour in general terms, that 
cannot be subsumed either to an individuahstic profit-maximising ration­
ality or to a collectivistic normative logic. This is what we could loosely 
define as the domain of the emotional, radically distinguished from the 
principles of economic rationality but, at the same time, with an indis­
putable individualistic imprint that sets it well apart from any moral or 
normative sphere. Nothing terribly original has been said so far. That 
human beings can be sentimental, in the same way as they are rational 
and moral, should be no surprise to anyone. The important thing to point 
out here is not the suitability of a psychology of emotions to make sense 
out of this "sentimental logic", but the existence of a particular social 
structure that turns personal sentiments into socially relevant attitudes. 
We need to know more about the specific characteristics of these social 
structures in different cultural and historical contexts. I n any case, Cheal's 
gift economy is one example of it, and I believe that informal co-operation 
among western Irish farmers is another one. I n this case, those personal 
sentiments turn out to be not just socially but economically relevant, since 
they form a constitutive ingredient of a specific set of productive relations. 
V I I C O N C L U S I O N 
The "post-peasant" character of the farming communities of the west of 
Ireland puts their mode of production in an uncomfortable conceptual 
space. I f we take the moral nature of peasant economies as a theoretical 
hypothesis (i.e., the empirical refutation of which does not affect the 
validity of our argument), we can claim then that the farm economy of the 
west of Ireland has lost its moral constitution because western Ir i sh 
farmers are no longer peasants, they are simple or petty commodity 
producers well integrated into the world capitalist market. But at the same 
time, they do not fully participate i n the capitalist rationality since their 
productive process has not been fully commoditised; they still have a 
substantial sphere of non-commodity transactions that cannot be merely 
subsumed under an "investment logic". To unravel the specific logic of this 
sphere of non-market relationships, we have taken two steps. First , we 
have identified the spheres of exchange that intersect the informal 
economy of family farmers: kinship and neighbourhood. Second, we have 
analysed the nature of those spheres as they constitute the social frame­
work for a particular set of productive relations. A case-study analysis has 
suggested that the economic behaviour predicated upon these relations of 
production could not be fully understood on the basis of the dichotomy 
between normative and rational action. The concept of "sentimental action" 
has been somehow advanced as a possible third way. 
Undoubtedly, further research wil l be required to turn into a more 
definitive argument what at this stage appears as a kind of theoretical 
intimation. And yet some preliminary conclusions should be advanced even 
if they are only to serve as a stimulus to that effect. There are some social 
structures or even, as in our case, productive relations, that make personal 
sentiments socially and economically relevant. To reduce those personal 
sentiments and emotions to "long-term" individualistic interests, or to see 
them as more or less abortive expressions of moral codes, makes us blind to 
the genuine meaning of this type of human experience. To disregard the 
emotional content of human behaviour in a particular social setting 
prevents us from 6!istmguishing the specific nature of this social setting — 
in other words, inhibits the perception and understanding of a different 
form of social relationship and blocks the possibility of monitoring its 
economic effects. My belief is that in rural Ireland, and probably in much 
of rural Western Europe, this form of social relationship results from the 
combined effect of a vanishing "moral economy" system with a not fully 
dominant "market economics" rationality. We need to know more about the 
internal characteristics of economies in transition, and particularly, about 
the role of specific social relations and cultural traditions in shaping 
changing economic contexts. 
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